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Abstract 
Across the modern world, socio-political change has contributed to transformation of 
fathers’ roles and of related official discourse. As most studies of discourse on 
fatherhood focus on Euro-American contexts, limited scholarly work explores 
Chinese discourse relating to family dynamics and gender roles, especially from a 
historical perspective. This paper therefore explores shifting Communist Party 
portrayals of the ideal family and father’s role, by analysing mass media data from 
1949 onwards. Four key phases of official discourse on family and fatherhood are 
revealed: during the period of collectivization, a nationalist model dominated, with 
fathers exhorted to devote themselves to economic development; during the post-Mao 
period of de-collectivization, an individualist model of parenting was promoted, with 
more intimate involvement in children’s education encouraged; during the period of 
marketization from the mid-1990s, a state-supported model of parenting was 
promoted, ‘envisaging fathers’ more active participation in household duties. Finally, 
during the period of individualization in the early 21st century, a ‘community model’ 
of parenting was promoted, emphasising the father’s dual role as nurturer and 
provider. While state discourse has superficially contested traditional patriarchal 
attitudes, challenges to such attitudes remain weak, and assumptions that the family 
and childcare are essentially the ‘woman’s realm’ remain entrenched. 
Keywords: Chinese fatherhood, official discourse, gender roles, child-rearing, 
household duties 
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Resumen 
En el mundo moderno, el cambio político ha contribuido a la transformación de los 
roles de los padres y del discurso oficial relacionado con ello. Como muchos estudios 
sobre la paternidad se centran en contextos euroamericanos, hay una limitada 
literatura científica que explore el discurso chino relacionado con las dinámicas 
familiares y los roles de género, especialmente desde una perspectiva histórica. Este 
estudio, por lo tanto, explora el cambio en el retrato de la familia ideal y el rol del 
padre según el Partido Comunista, analizando los medios de comunicación de masas 
de 1949 en adelante. Se revelaron cuatro fases clave en el discurso oficial sobre 
familia y paternidad: durante el periodo de colectivización, dominó un modelo 
nacionalista, incitando a los padres a dedicarse al desarrollo económico; durante el 
periodo postmaoista de decolectivización, se promovió un modelo de paternidad 
individualista, animando a una mayor involucración íntima en la educación de los 
hijos; durante el periodo de mercantilización de mitad de los años 1990, se promovió 
un modelo de paternidad apoyado por el estado, concebiendo una participación más 
activa de los padres en las tareas domésticas. Finalmente, durante el periodo de 
individulización a principio del siglo XXI, se promovió un “modelo comunitario” de 
paternidad, enfatizando el rol dual del padre como cuidador y proveedor. Mientras 
que el discurso estatal se enfrentó superficialmente a las actitudes tradicionales 
patriarcales, el desafío a esas actitudes sigue siendo débil, y las suposiciones de que 
la familia y el cuidado de los niños son esencialmente “el reino femenino” siguen 
atrincheradas. 
Palabras clave: paternidad china, discurso oficial, roles de género, crianza de los 
hijos, tareas domésticas
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onfucian ethics underpin the long-established popular images of 
parents, where the father takes charge of supporting the family, 
while the mother is responsible for household duties at home. 
However, a variety of social changes in post-1949 China have 
implied shifts in the roles of men and women in the public sphere – with Mao 
Zedong famously declaring that ‘women hold up half the sky’. In terms of 
parenthood in the private sphere, the role of parents has changed since the 
mid-twentieth century. Nonetheless, it is unclear to what extent it has changed 
and why it transformed at different times (Feng, 1996; Yan 2003; Yang 2010; 
Fong, 2017; Liong, 2017). This research aims to fill this gap by identifying 
the key phases of official policies, and any significant shifts in the content or 
emphasis of party ideology regarding the nature and status of the family, and 
the image of the ‘ideal father.’ 
 
Traditional Values/Expectations of Chinese Fathehood 
 
The culture value of Confucianism and Taoism has been deeply rooted in 
defining the traditional Chinese values and beliefs towards gender allocation 
within the hierarchical family, like ‘nan zhu wai, nv zhu nei’ (men take care 
of things outside the family whereas women take care of things inside the 
family) and ‘yi jia zhi zhu’ (the head-of-household). There are also different 
expectations of paternal and maternal parenting (Ho, 1987), like the popular 
saying, ‘yan fu ci mu’ (strict father, kind mother).  
The typical image of traditional patriarchal families is paternal control and 
authority. Traditional Chinese father’s primary role is a provider and teacher 
who provides for and disciplines children. Fatherhood in China means 
‘emphasizing strong parental control, obedience, shaming, love withdrawal, 
filial piety, family obligation, maintaining harmony, collectivism, 
protectiveness, and “training”’ (Hulei et al., 2006; Molenda-Kostanski, 2016, 
p.19). Unconscious gender ideology pressures all families to follow the 
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Modern Changes in Chinese Fatherhood 
 
With China’s rapid socioeconomic growth, fathers’ attitudes and behaviour 
have changed to some extent, a finding supported by ample empirical research 
(Abbott, Ming & Meredith, 1992; Ishii-Kuntz, 2015). However, there exist 
different views on the degree and forms of changing fatherhood. Therefore, 
research on changing fatherhood in certain periods from a historical 
perspective has the potential to refine and enrich the existing body of work. 
Xuan Li (2018) traces fathers’ parental and gender roles in traditional China 
(prior to 1911), the Republican era (1911-49), the Socialist era (1949-78), and 
the Reform era (1978-2000). She argues that Chinese fatherhood ‘moves from 
a rigid, emotionally reserved, power-asserting patriarch to a refreshingly equal 
relational model full of warmth, support, and intimacy’ (Li, 2018, p.16). 
Lingshu Hu (2018) uses a visual content analysis method to examine Chinese 
film posters from 1951 to 2016, highlighting five time intervals: 1951–58 (the 
early years of foundation), 1968–78 (during the Cultural Revolution), 1981–
87 (the early years of ‘Reform and Opening’), 1996–2002 (massive layoffs 
and millennium) and 2010–16 (present). He argues that Chinese men shifted 
from macho working-class men in the Mao era into ‘soft’/ ‘emasculated’ men 
in Post-Mao era. His argument further extends Kam Louie's (2014) research 
on Chinese masculinity, consisting of wen (mental or civil) and wu (martial or 
physical) paradigms. 
In the limited body of research on Chinese fatherhood from an historical 
perspective, most existing studies only target certain periods of socio-political 
shifts in family, rather than comprehensively examine all the changing 
trajectories in post-1949 China. This research will try to fill this gap by 
focusing on the changing image of the role of the ‘good father’ and ideal 
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Explaining Changing Fatherhood and National Discourse Impact on 
Fatherhood 
 
Various factors (e.g., the increasing economic force, governmental work on 
gender equality, and social policies on child welfare) have great impact on 
changing fatherhood. Among them, how national discourse impacts 
fatherhood has drawn great attention, with Gladys Pak Lei Chong remarking: 
‘Manliness and femaleness are political products according to the needs of the 
nation and the state at different historical moments’ (2013, p. 242).  
In the process of modernization, socioeconomic and demographic changes, 
especially the declining fertility rate and the return of women to work, 
contributed to national discourse on achieving child welfare and gender 
equality. Governments in Western and Eastern countries began to put forward 
a series of legal policies to transform parenting (Ishii-Kuntz, 2015), since 
‘parenting is no longer solely a private family issue and fathering cannot be 
developed in isolation from gender equal goals’ (O'Brien, 2009). 
In recent years, there is an increasing research on social construction of 
masculinity and fatherhood in Chinese context (e.g., Louie, 2014; Li, 2018; 
Cao & Lin, 2019). Although more researchers have started to explore the 
interplay between Chinese official propaganda and family, there is limited 
research related to how far Chinese official discourse results in the 
transformation of fatherhood. 
 
Theories Related to Fatherhood in China 
 
Walby (1990) defines patriarchy as ‘a system of social structures and practices 
where men dominate, oppress and exploit women’ (p. 20). She then 
distinguishes two forms of patriarchy: Private patriarchy is ‘based in the 
private sphere of the household, where individual patriarchs exploit women’s 
labour and exclude them from participation in the public sphere’; Public 
patriarchy is ‘based in public spheres such as the economy and state, which 
collectively segregate women in the labour market and politics from wealth, 
power, and status’ (Lim, 2019, pp.3-4). Walby’s theory will be used to analyse 
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why the CPC puts forward different state advocacies on fatherhood in 
different periods and to argue that Chinese private patriarchy must give way 
to public patriarchy at points of conflict. 
Silverstein (1996) argues that the traditional stereotype value of the 
father’s primary role of breadwinner deprives men’s needs for intimacy and 
emotional connectedness. Silverstein also reveals the practical method that 
‘redefining fathering to emphasize nurturing and providing will place men in 
equivalent dual roles’ (p. 5). Silverstein’s theory will be used to explain the 
CPC’s ability of satisfying man's needs for intimacy and emotional 
connectedness, and to determine whether the Chinese state advocacies aims 
to achieve gender equality or not. 
Anderson’s (2009) proposes Inclusive Masculinity Theory (IMT) to 
understand the changing relationship between males and their masculinities in 
different cultures. Anderson’s theory will be used to explain the diversity 
forms of masculinity and fatherhood in the process of Chinese modernization 
and globalization.  
In all, in investigating changes in fatherhood at the grassroots level, the 
nature of official discourse should be considered. This is because in a society 
like China’s, it is difficult to delineate public and private spheres and the 
regime has sought to penetrate the latter by refashioning familial norms and 
personal behaviour (Davis & Harrell, 1993; Xie, 2013). While many states 
have pursued programs of ‘public information’ to promote responsible 
parenting, the approach of China’s Communist regime has been more 
intrusive and draconian. At different historical points of the PRC, the CPC has 
sought to enlist the family in a state-directed drive for economic development 
and social transformation – demanding that citizens subordinate their private 
concerns to the Party’s definition of the collective public interest. Official 
values have been spreading into the masses under the strict media controls. 
The party-state has explicitly and implicitly influenced the evolving vision of 
the Chinese family and the role of the father within it. Understanding the shifts 
in party policy or ideology will enable us to study in what ways popular 
attitudes and behaviour have responded to or resisted official efforts to 
transform them. This paper therefore aims to investigate the following three 
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research questions: a) What ‘ideal father' has the party-state sought to promote 
at different times? b) How consistent have official messages been? What are 
the key shifts in official discourse on family and fatherhood since the Mao 
era? c) Why have these shifts occurred? 
 
Methods and Sources 
 
This study employs documentary analysis to find explanations regarding 
official discourse on fatherhood. Policy statements (i.e., new marriage law, 
one-child policy, two-child policy, and national five-year plans for family 
education) have been regarded as the official guidance on ideal Chinese 
marital relationship, family structure, parenting, gender role allocation and 
childcare welfare regime. In terms of mass media, this study selects the 
following four top print media focusing on Chinese official ideologies of 
family, parenting and gender roles.  
1) Women of China (WoC, Zhongguo Funu) is the first authoritative 
women’s magazine, launched in June 1939. It is the only magazine which has 
been continuously published by the All-China Women's Federation (ACWF) 
since 1949. It covers the latest social affairs, marriage, family, education, 
health and science. It is one of the most widely read magazines among women 




Figure 1. Women of China (WoC, Zhongguo Funu). 
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2) Parenting Science (PS, Fumu Bidu) is the first authoritative parenting 
magazine, launched in April 1980. It is a family education guide for parents 
of children aged 0-6. Since October 2008, its full electronic version has 
been freely accessible online, making it popular among younger computer 
literate pareuants. It is published nationwide with an annual circulation of 
960,000 (see Figure 2). 
 
 
Figure 2. Parenting Science (PS, Fumu Bidu). 
 
3) Women of China News (WoCN, Zhongguo Funu Bao), the only national 
daily newspaper for women, launched in October 1984 by ACWF. It reports 
and comments on socio-cultural affairs and policy changes on women and 
family. Its official website Chinese Women’s Network was set up in 1998, and 
its mobile app China Women’s Daily • MMS version was officially released 
in July 2004, significantly increasing the readership among young generations 
with mobile phones (see Figure 3). 




Figure 3. Women of China News (WoCN, Zhongguo Funu Bao). 
 
4) The Family Education of China (FEoC, Zhonghua Jiajiao) is the first 
official family education magazine, launched by ACWF and Chinese Family 
Education Association in 1993. It is a practical family education guidebook 
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The Changing Roles of Fatherhood in Post-1949 China 
 
This section will explore the ideal family and fatherhood in contemporary 
China via analysis of policy statements and ACWF-affiliated publications. 
This section will also investigate the degree of change in the discourse of 
fatherhood and masculinity alongside the changing national discourse of 
modernization and economic development. China has experienced significant 
social transformation since 1949, and the social norms about gender roles in 
family have been reshaped and reconstructed accordingly. Changes in 
fatherhood refer to not only attitudes and practices towards paternal parenting, 
but also the gender allocation of household work within the family. After 
analysing the official documents, this paper puts forward four phases of 
changing fatherhood, corresponding to the key shifts of propaganda related to 
family.   
 
Nationalist Model of Parenting (1950s-70s) 
 
Right after the founding of the People’s Republic of China (October 1st, 1949), 
the state’s priority was on ‘wei wen he jing ji fu su’ (maintaining stability and 
social-economic recovery). The brutal land reforms from January 1950 broke 
up the traditional extra extended family structure and generated many nuclear 
families. However, the existing patriarchal Chinese marriage traditions 
hindered the state’s control of the male-dominated power in these new types 
of families. New Marriage Law was thus launched on May 1, 1950 to 
challenge the patriarchal order in the individual ‘small’ family. Particularly, 
aiming to liberate women from unpaid work in the public ‘big’ family, Article 
48 of New Marriage Law regulated that ‘the state implements equal pay for 
men and women’. Meanwhile, to advocate that care for both children and the 
elderly is the parents’ inescapable responsibility, Article 49 of New Marriage 
Law regulated that ‘Parents are obligated to educate children and look after 
the elderly’. While working mothers were praised as glorious production 
models in socialist posters in the early 1950s, images of mothers raising 
children alone could also be found (see Figure 5). Family friendly support in 
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the labour force tended to be presented as support for mothers and put into full 
play by mothers, rather than as potential benefit to both parents, or fathers. 




Figure 5. Mother with her children. 
 
In the mid-1950s, China followed the Soviet model of social development. 
ACWF launched a national campaign of ‘wu hao jia ting’ (five good families) 
to shape the new socialist family-based morality. The standard of ‘five good 
families’ (e.g., good characters, good living standards, good civilization of 
urban and rural areas, and good neighbor relationship) was broadly spread 
(Zhang & Yue, 1956, p.17). In the public sphere, men and women were all 
encouraged to devote themselves to the socialist industrialization on a massive 
scale. However, in the private sphere, mothers were expected to educate and 
look after the children, allowing fathers to dedicate themselves to their work 
day and night. This is verified by a national poster titled ‘go to sleep, do not 
disturb daddy from working at night’ in 1955 (see Figure 6).  





Figure 6. Mother putting her children to sleep while their father works. 
 
Motivated by the goal of ‘chao ying gan mei’ (surpassing Great Britain and 
catching up with the United States) and the national strategic goals of four 
modernizations (i.e., industrial, agricultural, national defence and science and 
technological modernization), China entered the Great Leap Forward (1958-
1962). A series of collectivist social reforms broke up the original family 
structures, pulled individuals out of their families and embedded them in ‘dan 
wei’ (urban units) or rural people's communes. These highlighted communist 
attempts at ‘qu jia ting hua’ (de-familialization). The Party-State drew a 
picture of communist happiness (see Figure 7), shaping the collective psyche 










Figure 7. Communist happiness. 
 
However, the collectivist supports did not function as well as expected and 
the people’s sacrifices of ‘de-familialisation’ failed to accomplish the national 
targets of industrial development. Regarding parents’ roles, educating 
children in class education became parents’ revolutionary responsibility: 
 
What kind of responsibilities should each family shoulder in cultivating 
a new generation of revolutionaries? In a revolutionary family, the 
relationship between parents and children is not only the flesh-and-
blood relationship between the elder and the younger, but also a 
partnership between the predecessors and the successors in the 
revolution. Parents should not only develop our revolutionary 
successors, but also lead the new generation to more prosperity 
(People’s Daily Editorial, 1964). 
 
During the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976), the CPC did not 
acknowledge any distinction between ‘public’ and ‘private’. To deal with the 
increasing unemployment and urban growth problems (Xu, 2017), a large-
scale national campaign namely ‘shang shan xia xiang’ (up to the mountains, 
down to the villages) was launched in December 1968. Over 17 million middle 
and high school students were sent to villages to learn from the peasants. The 
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movement separated family members and seriously disrupted family lives. 
Peasants’ traditional gender and family values greatly impacted the values of 
‘xia xiang zhi qing’ (educated urban youth working in villages). Meanwhile, 
the Party-States issued official propaganda to persuade people that bourgeois 
morality would result in returning to capitalist society. It is clear that the 
Cultural Revolution represented the peak of masculine values wielding rifles. 
The image of Wu masculinity was predominant. Macho working-class men in 
Mao era, especially during the Cultural Revolution, were supposed to be ‘stoic 
and emotionally unexpressive’ (Hu, 2018, p.343).  
In sum, during the Maoist era of collectivization, family functions were 
replaced by the nationalist model of parenting, as seen in an article entitled 
‘comprehensive planning and strengthening of women and children's welfare 
work’ (Zhang, 1956, p.1-3). This article characterises the nationalist model of 
parenting in terms of national social institutions bearing the main 
responsibility of parenting. Traditional family-based functions have evolved 
into the collective’s responsibility. Fathers are explicitly advised via 
propaganda to devote themselves to the economic development, rather than to 
take time to raise and ‘control’ children. The family value of ‘domestic and 
harmonious family’ emphasized that all men and women should energetically 
contribute to socialist industrialization. However, propaganda circulated 
within China showed that mothers often took the main responsibility of 
looking after and educating children. The parenting value of raising a ‘healthy 
successor’ shows the states’ priority of socio-economic development and the 
Party-State control. The gender value of ‘qu xing bie hua’ (de-gender) and 
Mao’s belief of ‘what men can do; women can do’ make it clear that women 
were encouraged to fight against the masculinist socialist citizenship. Sexual 
discrimination in the labour market was still prevalent, although it was 
significantly weakened in the Mao era (Wang, 2010). Mao’s effort to justify 
the centrality of male authority in public life contributes to the decline of male 
authority in private life. However, although Mao’s ‘feminine gender role 
norms’ now socialized women to perform the double roles of provider and 
nurturer, Mao did not call for the revaluing of fatherhood.  
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Although during the Mao era, women made significant progress in attaining 
economic equality, gender allocation of household work and the dominant 
definition of fatherhood were not challenged. In other words, private 
patriarchy remained obedient to public patriarchy. The community bore the 
main responsibility of parenting, but mothers were still expected to be the 
main caregiver and father was still expected to be a good provider and 
children’s moral model.   
 
Individualist Model of Parenting (The Late 1970s – The mid-1990s) 
 
China experienced the process of de-collectivization and ‘zai jia ting hua’ (re-
familialization) after reform and opening-up (1978) and the early stages of the 
one-child policy (1979). Facing the old problem of traditional practices 
coming back into force after the Cultural Revolution and the new problem of 
raising a single child, the Second Marriage Law of 1980 was promulgated in 
January 1981. However, it imperfectly met demands resulting from the 
enormous changes in society. The census in 1982 showed that the ‘4-2-1 
family’ (referring to nuclear family unit consisting of four grandparents, 
parents and a child) had gradually become the main family structure. To 
advance the healthy development of the Chinese population and marriage 
relationships, Hu Yaobang, then-chairman of the CPC, gave instructions - ‘the 
problems of marriage and family should not only be restrained by the proper 
law, but also rely on the proper public opinion guiding ordinary people’ (Hu, 
1982). Afterwards, a public discussion was conducted in WoC about ‘what 
kinds of new morality and custom should be built up in the issues of marriage 
and family’ from June to September 1982. Regarding family relationships, 
Kang Keqing, then-leader of ACWF, made a special claim on the ACWF’s 
official book Marriage and Family Work with Children: 
 
Both husband and wife are the masters of the family. They should be 
equal and share the household duties. By setting up a democratic family 
style, the feudal patriarchal ideology and the traditional values of 
‘husband-head’ are overcome. It is also important for parents to nurture 
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children and support the elderly. Parents should educate and train their 
children to become useful people for the four modernizations – 
modernization of agriculture, industry, national defence and science 
and technology (Kang, 1982, p. 155). 
 
With the disintegration of the urban work unit system and rural 
collectivization, the Party-State distributed the responsibility of childcare into 
the duty of individual households. The previous collectivist support from 
work units and people’s commune in the Mao era was significantly eroding: 
the people's commune system was cancelled after 1983 and the so-called ‘tie 
fan wan’ (iron rice bowl) was also broken for urban workers in the late 1980s. 
After dismantling of the previous socialistic and collectivist welfare 
arrangements, the Party-State failed to establish supporting social 
organizations and welfare system to support childcare. In the end, the 
responsibility of providing public services such as pensions, childcare, 
medical care and education were transferred from the state to households 
through the market. China thus has stepped into the individualist modelling of 
parenting, where individual households take responsibility for childcare, 
resulting in ‘re-familialization’. Faced with greater responsibilities and risks, 
the traditional model of mutual assistance among extended family members 
once again became an important means for Chinese families to cope with risks 
and adapt to changes.  
In the post Mao era, the ‘su zhi’ (quality) of the population was 
increasingly emphasized since the labour force is the driving factor of socio-
economic development. ‘Su zhi jiao yu’ (Quality education) was first put 
forward in the 1980s and continuously developed in the 1990s. As Deng 
Xiaoping said, ‘the national modernization depends on the talent; the talent is 
cultivated by education while education is based on the family’, the 
importance of family education drew great attention. However, compared 
with legislation and supports for ‘quality education’ in school, the supports 
for ‘quality education’ in family primarily relied on parents themselves. 
Regarding how to raise well only children, ACWF concentrated on 
strengthening the connection between family education and school education 
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in rural area, and set up the new standards of ‘five good families’, namely 
‘have right political ideologies; work well; respectful to the elderly; educate 
children well and plan fertility well; hardworking and thrifty.’ Besides this, in 
1989 Parenting Science ACWF also praised young fathers, who became good 
responsible fathers through self-study:  
 
For this ‘sacred’ role as a father, I have purchased dozens of parenting 
books which talks about ancient and modern Chinese and foreign 
family education methodologies. I also read newspapers and periodicals 
and listen to radio programs of family and children. To become a so-
called modern good father with scientific methods to educate children, 
I also do self-reflection every day (Wang, 1989, p. 17). 
 
Furthermore, western parenting attitudes and practices, and child-centred 
values started to be introduced to China in an era of globalization. A famous 
educationist Chen Heqin, who is a father of seven children and the ‘father of 
Chinese early childhood education’, set up the first China Education Society 
Early Childhood Education Research Association, and emphasized that 
paternal involvement in children's education plays a vital role in creating a 
better future for children. He gave many speech encouraging fathers’ 
involvement in family, published by ACWF. Meanwhile, there were a 
growing number of ACWF’s reports and intellectuals’ papers in the WoC 
from the early 1990s, providing some practical suggestions for parents to 
scientifically educate their only children: 
 
A man should be grateful to his child. Without child, he cannot 
become a father. If he is not a father, he will not be a true and 
complete man...The father and son could wear same trousers. That is 
family happiness… (Jiang, 1994, p. 34). 
 
In sum, due to the implementation of the one-child policy in the period of 
de-collectivization and marketization, the value of the household as the 
foundational socio-economic unit was dramatically increased and the attitude 
of son preference was challenged to some extent. For instance, girls rather 
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than boys were always shown in the posters of implementing the one-child 
policy (see Figure 8). 
 
 
Figure 8. Girl with her parents. 
 
The key exception to one-child policy, i.e., to allow rural families to have 
a second child when the first child is a girl - was not a ‘challenge’ to son 
preference, but a concession to it in rural areas. On the other hand, in order to 
raise ‘ren kou su zhi’ (population quality), parenting involvement in raising 
children has been considered in the individualistic model of parenting. The 
Party abandoned any attempt to challenge or undermine parental authority 
within the family and implied that parents should undertake their childrearing 
duties rather than relying on the collective welfare and support. The new 
family value of building a ‘democratic harmonious new family’ indicates that 
men should share housework and childcare duties to ensure that all young men 
and women contribute more to the socialist modernization discourse. The 
parenting value of ‘scientific childcare’ encourages parents to raise only 
children of ‘high quality’. However, there remains some tensions over the 
issue of who should take care of children. One one hand, the images of 
mothers raising children are shown more often in the posters and official 
publications. On the other hand, there is an increasing voice of encouraging 
fathers’ participation in educating their only children from the early 1990s. 
However, the party-state did not provide the related legislation or 
comprehensive guidance to family education.  
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Under this individualist model of parenting, equalities at home and in the 
workplace thus become mutually reinforcing. Official documents both called 
for ‘chao xian qi liang mu’ (super good wife and kind mother) and the practice 
of ‘xian fu liang fu’ (good husband and kind father). The new term of ‘jia ting 
zhu fu’ (househusband) emerged. Note that education appears to be a key issue 
in the Chinese notion of parenting from the Deng era. Both school education 
and family education tend to educate children towards family and group 
orientation meanwhile emphasising individual values and opinions. It 
continues to challenge the concept of hegemonic masculinity and the authority 
of parents including the father. The traditional hegemonic masculinity has 
been replaced by inclusive masculinities, including the ‘modern’ masculinity 
which is understood as ‘more expressive, egalitarian and peaceable’ (Connell, 
2012, p. 7). Fathers prefer to develop children’s independent living ability and 
cultivate the independent consciousness (e.g., Wang & Yang, 1983, p.32-33; 
Deng, 1983, p.34-35). In the late 1980s and early 1990s emerged a portrayal 
of the father as carer and friend (implying equality and approachability), with 
the responsibility to cultivate a happy child with critical thinking (e.g., Xue, 
1992, p.40). 
 
State-Supported Model of Parenting (Mid-1990s to 2011) 
 
In 1995, the Chinese population reached 1.2 billion and the population of 
children reached 340 million. The previous individualist model of parenting 
could no longer meet the needs of narrowing the gap between the growing 
population of children and the quality of family education. The ‘liang gang’ 
(Two Outlines) and the revision of the Marriage Law therefore were 
implemented in 1995. Afterwards, the ‘quan guo jia ting jiao yu gong zuo jiu 
wu ji hua’ (National Ninth Five-year Plan for Family Education) was 
implemented by ACWF and Ministry of Education in 1996, marking the shift 
of Chinese family education from the family-oriented path into the 
government-led and administrative development path. The state-supported 
model of parenting began. The Outline for Planning the Development of 
Children in China in the Nineties advocated all parties to jointly promote the 
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physical and mental health of children, and to foster the socialist constructor 
and successor of a ‘si you’ (idealistic, ethical, cultural and disciplined person). 
In 1996, the national campaign of ‘five good families’ was changed into ‘wu 
hao wen ming jia ting’ (five good civilized families), namely, ‘love China and 
obey laws; study and work hard; respect gender equality; look after children 
and respect the elderly; scientifical parenting’. The article titled ‘dialogues in 
a family’ showed how parents should teach children:   
 
Family relations are binding ties - providing care and support in times 
of need... In the late 1990s, TVs had not become popular. Xiaomai 
really need money to buy a TV for watching English Channel. I gave 
him money and supported his study. Finally, Xiaomai scored 100 in 
English exam. ‘Great!’ I congratulated him sincerely (Yuan, 1997, pp. 
18-19). 
 
China stepped toward building ‘quan mian jian she xiao kang she hui’ (a 
well-off society all around) from 2000. Meanwhile, China also faced a rapidly 
growing population ageing trends (Hong, 2013). In the previous individualist 
modelling of parenting, isolated families led to mothers mainly looking after 
children and the elderly. A series of papers highlighted that educated mothers 
in cities suffered ‘double burden’ from both paid work and unpaid housework, 
while fathers spent more time watching TV than doing household chores or 
interacting with children (Olson, 2000, p.30-31). This phenomenon led to an 
increasing number of educated young women delaying marriage dates, and 
married women failing to fulfil their traditional duty of giving birth. The 
increasing number of ‘leftover women and men’ were portrayed as likely to 
threaten social stability (Fincher, 2016) and the growing number of DINK 
(dual income, no kids) and delayed birth time worsened the serious problem 
of aging society. The emerging state-supported model of parenting thus 
encouraged parents to focus more on child’s character development, as 
evidenced by a well-known article titled ‘close attention to the character 
development of only children’ in 1997 WoC (see Figure 9).   





Figure 9. Close Attention to the Character Development of Only Children, 
published in WoC, 1997. 
 
Hu Jintao, the leader of China from 2002 to 2012, said “a harmonious 
family is the foundation of a harmonious society and morality is an important 
fulcrum for a harmonious society” (Hu, 2002). A new project of ‘family 
civilization’ was launched by ACWF from 2004. China’s first national 
conference of commending the advanced units and individuals in family 
education, entitled ‘double qualification,’ was held in 2005. In addition, facing 
the social moral decline, a report titled ‘always highlight the theme of moral 
education’ argued that parents should stress more on moral development than 
intellectual development of children (Chen, 2007).   
Moreover, official propaganda started to introduce Western styles of 
parenting. Specifically, official propaganda increasingly advocated against 
‘father absence’ and supported men’s greater engagement in household duties, 
as confirmed by a series of papers, such as ‘in the United States, it has become 
a fashion for fathers to share childcare responsibilities, especially in middle-
income families’ (Tai, 2005, p.42), and ‘Britain advocates fathers to enjoy 
parental leave for increasing parental responsibility’ (Wu, 2007). From 2000 
to 2012, there are 91 articles related to fatherhood in the WoCN and 7 articles 
related to American and British fathers’ new standard of a ‘good father’. Jin 
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Yong’s article titled ‘what do Chinese fathers lack?’ (Jin, 2000) indicates that 
the role of the ‘strict father’ has been abandoned by more and more fathers, 
and father’s spoiling of children has become a worrying issue for mothers. 
‘How to be a good father’ was discussed and western values were widely 
publicised. An article entitled ‘American have a new standard of ‘good 
father’’ (Yang, 2004) shows that young American fathers hope to reorganize 
work and life because they think it is important to build strong relationship 
with the child. They should not only earn money, but also educate and play 
with children.  
In terms of gender values, there were more contradictions on the ideal 
gender model than ever. On one hand, the official propaganda in mass media 
reshaped the intergenerational transformation of gender stereotypes and the 
traditional gender-segregated chores. For example, the widespread paper ‘a 
story of a mosuo family’ (Lielai, 2004, pp.32-34) introduced the life of 
matrilineality in Yunnan province and the customs of maternal uncles helping 
raising children. A more gender-neutral model was propagated through 
official media. Li Yuchun, a popular female singer who schews traditional 
women’s clothes and employ gender-neutral behaviours, embodies this trend. 
Contradicting this, official media also advocated for traditional gender 
education encouraging girls to be feminine and boys to be masculine. For 
instance, female weaving and cooking classes were held in Tongji Women's 
College because officers believed young women should be good at traditional 
mothers’ ‘shou yi’ (craft) (Shi, 2005).  
In sum, the marginalized father’s role attracted great attention in the 
process of modernization and globalization. The increasing individual 
orientation challenges Chinese vertical bonds of hierarchy and filial piety, and 
continually reconstructs gender roles. Chinese government has taken the state-
supported model of parenting to overcome the unstable socioeconomic 
conditions in the beginning of 21st century. To achieve a harmonious society 
under the control of the Party-State, the family value of building a 
‘harmonious family’ is particularly emphasized. However, the gender value 
of shaping ‘gender neutrality’ struggles: on one hand, the stereotype of gender 
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image is challenged to some extent; yet on the other hand, the official message 
on gender roles and parenting is inconsistent. 
 
Community Model of Parenting (2012 – the Present) 
 
Massive urbanization (growing from 16% in 1960 to 57% in 2016) has led to 
61 million so called left-behind children (i.e., those whose parents have 
migrated to urban areas for work, leaving their children in the care of 
relatives), which accounted for 23.6% of all children in 2010 (Hong, 2013). 
The previous policies attempting to strengthen the protection and care of left-
behind children in the countryside have struggled to match needs. New Law 
on the Protection of Minors was launched in 2012, indicating that fathers must 
pay for the childcare fee to mothers after divorce. Following this, the 
implementation of the National Twelfth Five-Year Plan for Family Education 
in 2012 marked the shift of Chinese family education from giving priority to 
urban areas to a universal development path. National legislation on family 
welfare also showed the state has been increasingly adopting Western 
approaches of generous childcare support. In April 2012, ‘Female workers 
labour protection special provisions (draft)’ was implemented to prolong 
maternity leave from 90 to 98 days. After the implementation of Population 
and Family Planning Law from December 2015, many provinces revised the 
local family planning and extended paternity leave days. Additionally, ACWF 
promoted compulsory family education college courses (Qiao, 2017). China 
has evolved into the community model of parenting, increasing the integration 
of family, school and society education into children’s family education: 
 
Chinese family education should be carried out based on scientific 
research, publicity and training. Under the principle of ‘children-
oriented’, ‘parent subject’ and ‘multi-directional interaction’, we 
attempt to build a comprehensive family education guidance service 
system that covers urban and rural areas to promote public services for 
family education (Wang, 2016).  
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A popular reality show in Hunan Province, ‘Dad, Where are We Going?’, 
started in 2013, and has portrayed various images of good fathers, such as 
‘friendly father’ (e.g., The relationship between Zhang Liang and his son), 
‘soft father’ (e.g., Lin Zhiyin gently educates his son), and ‘active father’ (e.g., 
Wu Zun positively encourages his children to express freely). Although this 
is a local media representation, it was highly praised by Chinese official 
newspapers. For instance, People’s Daily, published a commentary in 2013 
by commentator Liu Yangsheng, saying “the strong father-child relationship 
embodied in the reality show makes people feel warm and encourages people 
to return to their families.” The ACWF also published a series of reports and 
papers to praise the ‘involved fathers’ depicted in this program, and 
encouraged young fathers to learn from them.  
However, another strand in recent official discourse indicated a regression 
to hierarchical models of fatherhood, especially since the advent of the Xi era. 
Legislation may serve a symbolic function – i.e. signalling that the 
government ‘cares’ about this issue, even if it may not actually do much about 
it. Recent legislative changes suggested a ‘traditionalist’ or Confucian turn in 
family law. For instance, a new Law of Protection of Rights and Interests of 
the Aged in 2013 requires the offspring of parents older than 60 to visit their 
parents ‘frequently’ and to ensure their financial and spiritual needs are met. 
Furthermore, in the context of an increasingly aging society, population policy 
was amended in 2015 to institute what is effectively a two-child policy (see 
Figure 10). However, the burden of taking care of four parents and two 











Figure 10. Parenting Science cover. 
 
Regarding responsibility for childcare, official messages remain unclear or 
contradictory. On one hand, the ACWF explicitly encourages fathers’ positive 
engagement, confirmed by an article titled ‘father needs to hold up half of the 
sky in the family education’ (Wang, 2017). On the other hand, the ACWF also 
insists on women taking more responsibility. For instance, the campaign of 
‘five good civilized families’ was changed to ‘zui mei jia ting’ (the most 
beautiful families) and its standards were revised. Most of the award winners 
of ‘the most beautiful families’ were mothers who not only do well in their 
career but also devote themselves to household duties.  
In sum, in the process of individualization, China has set up community 
model of parenting, which comprehensively enhances the childcare supports 
from family, society and the state. The official vision on the family value of 
the ‘beautiful family’ has emphasized ‘jia feng’ (family spirit), ‘jia xun’ 
(family training) and ‘jia jiao’ (family education), but legislation provides 
little on the role of fathers. The parenting value of ‘various parents’ role’ 
allows people to balance work and life, and rethink father’s various roles 
except for provider and discipliner. However, China has not really begun to 
move away from the assumption that the family and childcare are essentially 
‘women’s realm’. Some scholars (Silverstein, 1996; Seward & Stanley-
Stevens, 2014) predict that the pattern of friendly father will not be achieved 
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unless there is a concerted and sustained effort to support fathers who wish to 
be more involved with their children. The gender value of ‘women hold up 
half of the sky outside of home, and men hold up half of the sky inside of 
home’ should aim to achieve women’s ‘liberation’ by calling for greater 
contributions from fathers in the private sphere.  
 
Conclusions and Discussions 
 
This paper provides an explanation of the periodization of official discourse 
on fatherhood based on the continuous official historical documents and mass 
media data in post-1949. During the period of collectivization (1950s - 70s), 
the CPC has taken the nationalist model of parenting. Fathers are explicitly 
advised by propaganda to devote themselves to the economic development, 
rather than take time to raise and ‘control’ children. A responsible father 
means focusing on actively attending the states and communities’ work and 
events. The increasing number of dual earner families to some extent relieves 
the problem of male privilege because ‘mothers and fathers can do the same 
things’. But social institutions’ supporting parenting have not significantly 
influenced gender allocation of household duties since revaluing of fathers’ 
roles is not the priority. The father-child relationship is regarded as secondary 
to mother-child relationship. During the period of de-collectivization (the late 
1970s - the mid-1990s), the CPC adopted an individualist model of parenting. 
The ideal father-child relationship become closer. In the process of ‘re-
familialization’, there were some tensions over the issue of who should take 
care of children. On one hand, the image of mothers raising children were 
shown more often in official propaganda. On the other hand, the voice of 
encouraging father’s participation in educating only children increased. A 
responsible father means providing good environment and/or educating 
children regardless their gender. During the period of marketization (the mid-
1990s - 2011), the CPC took measures to promote a state-supported model of 
parenting. Men’s increasing needs for intimacy and emotional connectedness 
contributed to a decline of hegemonic masculinity and promoted a redefinition 
of fatherhood, making the prevailing models of fatherhood more father 
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friendly and discursive. Father’s more intimate involvement in children’s life 
was encouraged. During the period of individualization (2012 - now), China 
has established a community model of parenting. The parenting value of 
‘various parents’ role’ allows people to rethink father’s traditional roles, and 
father’s emotional role is expected to a degree. Redefining the morden ‘good 
enough father’ (i.e., emphasizes nurturing as well as providing) has become 
the centre of gender socialization for responsible men. The concept of father 
as nurturer has the potential to change the traditional stern and disciplinarian 
father within a hierarchical family into a more emotional and responsible 
father within a democratic family.  
Through documentary analysis, this study also finds that the PRC policy 
statements have promoted the liberation of women in both private and public 
spheres, but have seldom highlighted the role of father within the family. The 
messages in print media have superficially contested the constancy of 
traditional patriarchy and its influence in reconstructing gender role 
allocations remains unclear and contradictory. A gap between official rhetoric 
and public policy remains. Although ACWF recently welcomed public 
opinions, the free and uncensored sharing of opinions are not allowed to be 
published. It proves Fincher’s (2016) argument that the ACWF exists to 
prevent the emergence of any independent women’s movement, not to provide 
a platform for the voice of women. Moreover, this research agrees with 
scholars on Chinese fatherhood (Hu, 2018; Li, 2018) that education has 
become a key role of transforming fatherhood, with a diminished preference 
for sons in the reform era.  
In all, this research argues that state advocacy of active mothers’ and 
fathers’ equivalent dual roles of provider and nurturer in different periods 
serves to the state’s rapid economic development and social stability, and 
reinforces patriarchal culture and society in China. It has hindered the 
acceptance of diverse family forms and has deprived fathers’ rights and needs 
for intimacy and emotional connectedness with their children. During the Mao 
era, the ‘state feminist’ (Wang, 2010) gender role norms socialized women to 
perform the dual roles of provider and nurturer, which were not for the benefit 
of a private patriarch/individual fatherhood, but for the collective of public 
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patriarchy/ ‘state fatherhood’ (Heng & Janadas, 1995). In the case of a conflict 
of interest between the public and individual, the ideology of the official 
discourse calls for the accommodation of private/family to state’s needs of 
economic development and the well-being/harmony of the collective, rather 
than advocating for the rights and well-being of the individual. During the 
Post-Mao era, official discourse has redefined fathering to emphasize 
nurturing as well as providing, which serves the state’s considerations of 
capitalist development, rather than as a recognition of gender equality. Once 
a conflict of father’s responsibilities in nurturing and providing happens, the 
official ideology suggests that mother must accommodate father’s 
commitment to work, rather than advocating for a compromise to balance the 
needs of both father and mother who are both provider and nurturer. Official 
discourse reflects the ideology that fathers must live up to their obligation as 
breadwinner and head-of-household. This reinforces male privilege and 
female subordination, namely the continuance of a male-dominated family 
model. The inequitable dual roles in private and public thus mutually reinforce 
Chinese patriarchal tendencies. In all, gender equality is not a priority in the 
Communist period.  
Lastly, differentiating between the understanding of ‘propaganda’ and 
‘representation’ in Chinese context is very important, but it is hard to answer 
the question whether or not all media representations are propaganda in China. 
The researcher is aware that Chinese official control of media mass is 
generally strong and is getting stronger. Through its examination of official 
discourse on changing fatherhood, this research also poses some key questions 
to consider for future researchers. To what extent has official discourse on 
fatherhood resulted in the transformation of popular discourse? In what ways 
has this change occurred? What gap remains between official discourse and 
popular discourse on changing fatherhood? Research into the impacts of 
changing national discourse on popular masculinity and fatherhood can foster 
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